LANDMARK CASES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY:
Criminal Responsibility
M’Naughten Case, 1843
Case Summary:
M’Naughten was a Scottish woodturner with delusions of persecution by the Tory party. While attempting to kill the prime minister, he mistakenly shot his secretary instead. He was found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI).
The House of Lords subsequently defined the NGRI standard: due to a mental illness, the defendant must either have:
Not known what he was doing (cognitive prong)
If he did know what he was doing, he didn’t know that it was wrong (moral prong)
Key Concepts:
M’Naughten Standard for Insanity
Due to a mental illness, the defendant either:
Didn’t know what he was doing (cognitive prong)
If he did know what he was doing, he didn’t know that it was wrong (moral prong)
Durham v. US, 1954
Case Summary:
Durham, a man with a history of psychosis and several inpatient admissions, was convicted of burglary after he failed to meet the existing standards for insanity (M’Naughten and Irresistible Impulse)
His conviction was reversed by the DC Court of Appeals.
There was some evidence of mental illness, which shifts the burden to the state to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
A more modern insanity standard should be whether the act was the “product of a mental disease or defect” rather than the M’Naughten standard.
Key Concepts:
Durham Rule/Product Rule:
“The defendant is not criminally responsible if the unlawful act was the product of a mental disease or defect”
Note: later overturned and replaced by the ALI Model Penal Code
Washington v. US, 1967
Case Summary:
Washington was convicted on various charges after mounting an unsuccessful insanity defense.
On appeal, the DC Circuit Court ruled that the ultimate issue (whether the insanity standard was met, in this case the product rule) is for the trier of fact (the jury) to decide, not the expert witness. The expert witness may not testify conclusively to the ultimate issue.
Key Concepts:
Expert witnesses are prohibited from testifying conclusively to the ultimate issue in insanity cases.
Expert witnesses should limit the use of confusing medical jargon, explaining their diagnoses and rationale when necessary.
Frendak v. US, 1979
Case Summary:
Frendak was found competent to proceed and convicted of homicide. She appealed the conviction on the grounds that the judge raised the insanity defense over her competent objection.
DC Court of Appeals found in favor of Frendak, ruling that if the decision to waive an insanity defense is both intelligent and voluntary, the court must defer to the competent defendant’s decision.
There are legitimate reasons to waive an insanity defense, which may include concerns about stigma, indefinite confinement, mental health treatment, or desire to make a political statement
Key Concepts:
A defendant may competently refuse to raise an insanity defense if the decision is both “intelligent and voluntary”
Insanity defense may be raised over objection if the defendant is unable to make the decision, or their decision to waive is not intelligent and voluntary.
Jones v. US, 1983
Facts of Case:
Jones was found NGRI on a misdemeanor theft charge and committed to St Elizabeth’s Hospital.
He requested release, arguing he’d been admitted for longer than a hypothetical criminal sentence; the request was denied. He appealed, arguing 14th Amendment violations of Due Process and Equal Protection.
US Supreme Court ruled the NGRI verdict was adequate justification for civil commitment at a lower standard of proof.
Insanity acquittees are a special constitutional class, and may be treated differently.
Key Concepts:
NGRI acquittees may be civilly committed using a lower standard of proof (preponderance of evidence) than ordinary civil commitment (clear and convincing) as the NGRI verdict demonstrates findings of mental illness and dangerousness
There’s no necessary correlation between the duration of commitment of NGRI acquittees and the severity of the offense
Commitment of insanity acquittees serves a different purpose than incarceration (treatment vs. punishment)
Foucha v. Louisiana, 1992
Case Summary:
Foucha was found NGRI and committed to a psychiatric hospital. On review for release, Foucha was found to be still dangerous (due to antisocial personality disorder), but no longer mentally ill, thus commitment was continued as per Louisiana statute.
US Supreme Court found that continued commitment of an NGRI acquittee who is no longer mentally ill violates both Due Process as well as Equal Protection, and Louisiana’s statute was unconstitutional
Key Concepts:
NGRI acquittees must remain BOTH mentally ill AND dangerous to justify continued commitment
Once an NGRI acquittee is no longer mentally ill, they are no longer considered a special constitutional class and cannot be treated differently from other criminals (for whom release is expected at the end of sentence)
Clark v. Arizona, 2006
Facts of Case:
Clark attempted to introduce evidence of mental illness to demonstrate both inability to form the required mental state as well as legal insanity. He did not meet the AZ legal standard for insanity.
Under AZ code, evidence of mental illness may only be introduced in relation to insanity. The AZ insanity standard included only the moral prong of M’Naughten (right/wrong), not the cognitive prong (nature & quality of act)
US Supreme Court ruled there’s no constitutional right to a specific legal definition of insanity, and states may restrict the introduction of evidence of mental illness to insanity defenses.
Key Concepts:
There is no constitutional right to a particular legal definition of insanity.
Insanity standards vary by state; some have no such defense.
Kahler v. Kansas, 2020
Case Summary:
Kahler admitted to murdering multiple family members, but argued that due to severe mental illness at the time of the offense, he was unable distinguish right from wrong nor conform his conduct to the law. He appealed his conviction, arguing violations of Due Process and protection from Cruel & Unusual Punishment.
Kansas uses a “mens rea” approach, focusing on mental state at the time of the crime. Moral capacity (right/wrong) is not considered, nor is lack of volitional control due to a mental illness. As Kahler knew what he was doing, he didn’t meet the insanity standard.
US Supreme Court ruled that the mens rea approach is not unconstitutional, and states are not required to include moral capacity in insanity standards.
Key Concepts:
States are not required to implement an insanity standard that considers moral capacity at the time of the offense (moral prong of M’Naughten)
“Mens rea” approaches focused on mental state at the time of the offense rather than ability to appreciate wrongfulness do not violate Due Process.
Ibn-Tamas v. US, 1979
Facts of Case:
Ibn-Tamas was the victim of years of intimate partner violence. She shot and killed her husband during an argument, claiming that she did so out of self-defense and a fear of imminent danger given a history of threats involving a firearm (as recently as that morning)
Defense tried to offer expert testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome to explain Ibn-Tamas’ mental state at the time, which was found inadmissible due to concern for potential prejudicial impact. Ibn-Tamas was convicted of murder.
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding that the expert testimony was admissible because the probative value outweighed potential prejudicial impact
Key Concepts:
Expert testimony about Battered Woman Syndrome may be found admissible despite potential prejudicial impact
Montana v. Egelhoff, 1996
Case Summary:
Egelhoff was charged with murder, and argued he was unable to form the required criminal intent (mens rea) due to intoxication. The jury was instructed not to consider Egelhoff’s intoxication, and he was convicted.
US Supreme Court ruled that exclusion of evidence of voluntary intoxication does not violate Due Process.
Key Concepts:
Suppression of evidence of voluntary intoxication to demonstrate a lack of criminal intent is not a violation of due process.